Kessel von Korsun: Unterschied zwischen den Versionen
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| − | |DATUM= | + | |DATUM=28. Januar 1944 - 18. Februar 1944 |
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| − | |ORT=Oblast Tscherkassy (Черкаська область) | + | |ORT=[http://de.wikipedia.org/wiki/Oblast_Tscherkassy/ Oblast Tscherkassy (Черкаська область)] |
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| − | + | Im Winter 1944 kam es vor Cherkassy zur Einkesselung von zweieinhalb deutschen Divisionen. Die 1. und 2. ukrainische Front stießen zwischen [http://local.live.com/?v=2&sp=Point.s6rgsskkkjf7_Schanderowka_M-36-087__&encType=1/ Schanderowka (Шендеровка)] und [http://local.live.com/?v=2&sp=Point.s684mqkk2pqm_Lissianka_M-36-098__&encType=1/ Lissianka (Лысянка)] zusammen. Trotz des Befehls Adolf Hittlers, den Kessel unbedingt zu halten, befahl der Oberbefehlshaber der Heeresgruppe Süd, Generalfeldmarschall Erich von Mannstein, den Ausbruch aus dem Kessel. | |
| + | <br/><br/> | ||
| + | ==Die Lage im Im Januar 1944== | ||
| + | |||
| + | <br/><br/> | ||
| + | |||
| + | ==Die Einkesselung== | ||
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| + | <br/><br/> | ||
| + | |||
| + | ==Der wandernde Kessel== | ||
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| + | <br/><br/> | ||
| + | |||
| + | ==Der Ausbruch== | ||
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| + | <br/><br/> | ||
| + | |||
| + | ==Quellenangaben== | ||
| + | * [http://www.amazon.de/exec/obidos/ASIN/3860471368/wwwkiesslinbi-21/ Chronik des 2. Weltkrieges - Chronik Verlag ISBN: 3-86047-136-8] | ||
| + | * [http://www.amazon.de/exec/obidos/ASIN/3926584564/wwwkiesslinbi-21/ Die Hölle von Tscherkassy - von Anton Meiser ISBN: 3-92658-456-4] | ||
| + | * | ||
| + | <br/><br/> | ||
| + | <!--- | ||
==January 1944== | ==January 1944== | ||
In January 1944, the German forces of Field Marshal [[Erich von Manstein]]’s [[Army Group South]] including General Otto Wöhler's [[German Eighth Army|8th Army]] had fallen back to the [[Panther-Wotan Line]], a defensive position along the [[Dniepr]] river in [[Ukraine]]. Two corps, the [[German XI Army Corps|XI]] under Gen. Wilhelm Stemmermann, the [[XLII Army Corps]] under Lt.Gen. Theobald Lieb and the attached [[Corps Detachment B]] from the 8th Army were holding a [[salient]] into the Soviet lines extending some 100 kilometers to the Dniepr river settlement of Kanev, with the town of [[Korsun]] roughly in the center of the salient, west of [[Cherkassy]]. Marshal of the Soviet Union [[Georgy Zhukov]] realized the potential for destroying Wöhler’s 8th Army with the Stalingrad model as precedent and using similar tactics as were applied to defeat Paulus’ encircled 6th Army. Zhukov recommended to the Soviet Supreme Command ([[Stavka]]) to deploy 1st and 2nd Ukrainian Fronts to form two armored rings of encirclement: an inner ring around a cauldron and then destroy the forces it contained, and an external ring to prevent relief formations from reaching the trapped units. Despite repeated warnings from Manstein and others, [[Hitler]] refused to allow the exposed units to be pulled back to safety. | In January 1944, the German forces of Field Marshal [[Erich von Manstein]]’s [[Army Group South]] including General Otto Wöhler's [[German Eighth Army|8th Army]] had fallen back to the [[Panther-Wotan Line]], a defensive position along the [[Dniepr]] river in [[Ukraine]]. Two corps, the [[German XI Army Corps|XI]] under Gen. Wilhelm Stemmermann, the [[XLII Army Corps]] under Lt.Gen. Theobald Lieb and the attached [[Corps Detachment B]] from the 8th Army were holding a [[salient]] into the Soviet lines extending some 100 kilometers to the Dniepr river settlement of Kanev, with the town of [[Korsun]] roughly in the center of the salient, west of [[Cherkassy]]. Marshal of the Soviet Union [[Georgy Zhukov]] realized the potential for destroying Wöhler’s 8th Army with the Stalingrad model as precedent and using similar tactics as were applied to defeat Paulus’ encircled 6th Army. Zhukov recommended to the Soviet Supreme Command ([[Stavka]]) to deploy 1st and 2nd Ukrainian Fronts to form two armored rings of encirclement: an inner ring around a cauldron and then destroy the forces it contained, and an external ring to prevent relief formations from reaching the trapped units. Despite repeated warnings from Manstein and others, [[Hitler]] refused to allow the exposed units to be pulled back to safety. | ||
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[[sv:Korsun-Tjerkassy-fickan]] | [[sv:Korsun-Tjerkassy-fickan]] | ||
[[uk:Корсунь-Шевченківська операція]] | [[uk:Корсунь-Шевченківська операція]] | ||
| + | ---> | ||
Version vom 21. November 2007, 23:43 Uhr
| Kessel von Korssun / Cherkassy | |||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Teil von: Russlandfeldzug | |||||||
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| Konfliktparteien | |||||||
 Deutschland
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 Sovietunion
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| Befehlshaber | |||||||
| Erich von Mannstein | Georgy Zhukov | ||||||
| Truppenstärke | |||||||
| 56.000 | 200.000 | ||||||
| Verluste | |||||||
| 20.000 | 24.286 | ||||||
Im Winter 1944 kam es vor Cherkassy zur Einkesselung von zweieinhalb deutschen Divisionen. Die 1. und 2. ukrainische Front stießen zwischen Schanderowka (Шендеровка) und Lissianka (Лысянка) zusammen. Trotz des Befehls Adolf Hittlers, den Kessel unbedingt zu halten, befahl der Oberbefehlshaber der Heeresgruppe Süd, Generalfeldmarschall Erich von Mannstein, den Ausbruch aus dem Kessel.
Die Lage im Im Januar 1944
Die Einkesselung
Der wandernde Kessel
Der Ausbruch
Quellenangaben
- Chronik des 2. Weltkrieges - Chronik Verlag ISBN: 3-86047-136-8
- Die Hölle von Tscherkassy - von Anton Meiser ISBN: 3-92658-456-4